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T
he Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 
responded to charges of redlining and dis-
crimination by financial institutions. It induces 
depository institutions to “help meet the credit 
needs of the local communities in which they are char-
tered” in a manner “consistent with the safe and sound 
operation of such institutions.”1 With these guiding 
principles and broad regulator discretion as to how to 
implement them, the act has proven flexible and adapt-
able over time.
Much has been written in both critique and defense 
of the CRA.2 Critics suggest that this government med-
dling distorts markets, but evidence from CRA-covered 
institutions indicates that the act has led to an increase 
in related lending activities in minority and low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods without negatively 
impacting profitability.3 In the wake of the subprime 
meltdown, this debate has taken on a new dimension: 
some blame the CRA for the crisis,4 while others—in-
cluding the Comptroller of the Currency and the CEO of 
Bank of America—dismiss the notion.5 As former Federal 
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Reserve Governor Randall S. Kroszner recently asserted, 
“the evidence does not support the view that the CRA 
contributed in any substantial way to the crisis in the 
subprime mortgage market.”6 
In this piece, we present our own evidence that 
CRA activity can be undertaken in a safe, sound, and 
profitable manner, but we also go further. Our opinion, 
based on a CRA-related mortgage program and data 
on the CRA Service Test (along with observations on 
the prevalence of check cashers and payday lenders in 
low-income geographies), is that there has been rather 
too little CRA. The recent subprime crisis puts into stark 
relief the misalignment between the intent of the CRA 
and the reality of the financial services landscape. This 
paper examines aspects of the incentive mechanisms of 
the CRA, considering those that work well and those that 
should be adjusted to strengthen the act’s effectiveness.
The CRA’s Incentive Mechanisms
The CRA creates an “affirmative obligation” whereby 




(April 29, 2005): 101—233.
3   Robert B. Avery, Raphael W. Bostic and Glen B. Canner, “CRA Special Lending Programs,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (November 2000): 
711—31,	available	at	http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2000/1100lead.pdf	discusses	impact	on	lender	profitability;	Joint	Center	for	
Housing Studies, Harvard University (JCHS), “The 25th Anniversary of the Community Reinvestment Act: Access to Capital in an Evolving 
Financial	Services	System”	(Cambridge	Massachusetts,	March	20,	2002),	available	at	http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/crareport.html	
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institutions seek to provide evidence of positive actions 
taken.7 While the act gives each of the four supervisory 
agencies leeway in setting rules for evaluating 
compliance,8,9,10 each examination results in a publicly 
available narrative report and a rating: Outstanding, 
Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or Substantial 
Noncompliance. The public serves a complementary 
evaluation function, using CRA examination results, 
publicly available lending data such as Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, and an institution’s 
performance vis a vis any CRA agreements it has 
entered. Through access to examiner reports, the public 
also regulates the regulators. In these ways, advocates, 
community groups, and private citizens have had a 
major hand in implementing the act.11 
Yet there remains a lack of equal access to credit for 
certain communities and minority groups, a gap that 
appears to have been exploited by high-cost and preda-
tory lenders. While the CRA is not a total solution to such 
problems, it is worth noting that in the history of the CRA, 
as of a 2005 report, only eight applications for actions 
by institutions subject to the CRA had been denied out 
of 92,177 applications submitted,12 and that out of over 
60,000 exams since 1990, 96 percent received a Satisfac-
tory or Outstanding grade, while only 0.4 percent earned 
a rating of Substantial Noncompliance.13 Such data 
indicate that more could be done within the jurisdiction 
of the CRA.
We now provide evidence related to two of the tests 
involved in CRA-based action—the Lending Test and the 
Service Test—to shed light on how the act influences 
institutions’ behavior as intended and how it could better 
address current realities. 
The Lending Test and CRA Special 
Mortgage Programs
CRA performance can be measured under three 
categories of activities: lending, service, and investment, 
with the Lending Test carrying the most weight.14 The 
Lending Test tallies the amount and proportion of loans 
made within an institution’s CRA assessment area, and 
how those loans are distributed across neighborhoods 
and borrowers of different income categories.15 “CRA-re-
lated” refers to loans made by CRA-regulated institutions 
in low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods, or 
to LMI households or small businesses with revenues 
below $1 million, within their assessment areas.16 The 
7	 	Certain	violations	of	fair	lending	laws	may	be	counted	against	institutions	as	well,	see	Richard	D.	Marsico,	“The	2004-2005	Amendments	to	






cessed November 18, 2008. 
10	 	See	Marsico,	“The	2004-2005	Amendments	to	the	Community	Reinvestment	Act	Regulations.”	This	summary	of	the	2004-2005	changes	to	the	
act	illustrates	the	jurisdiction	that	the	agencies	have	in	implementing	the	act.	For	example	in	2004	and	2005	these	agencies	issued	consequen-
tial amendments—some of which differed from agency to agency, so that now “the four federal banking agencies that enforce the CRA have 
significantly	different	CRA	regulations”	(541).
11	 	Anne	B.	Shlay,	“Influencing	the	Agents	of	Urban	Structure:	Evaluating	the	Effects	of	Community	Reinvestment	Organizing	on	Bank	Residential	
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Lending Test also favors the use of innovative or flexible 
lending practices “in a safe and sound manner to address 
the credit needs of low- or moderate-income individuals 
or geographies.”17 
In response to this call for innovative lending practic-
es, most CRA-covered institutions develop “CRA Special 
Lending Programs,” usually related to home mortgage 
lending. According to the profile of CRA Special Lending 
Programs, a large majority (83 percent) of these programs 
involve changes to underwriting standards. The three 
most common variations are: reduced cash required to 
close (through lower down payment and/or lower cash 
reserve requirements); alternative measures and/or lower 
standards of credit quality; and flexibility in assessing re-
payment ability (through higher debt ratios and/or flexible 
requirements for employment history). The majority of 
programs combine neighborhood and borrower targeting. 
In line with the CRA’s emphasis on safety and soundness, 
93 percent of responding organizations described their 
programs as profitable or breakeven.18
In this volume, former Federal Reserve Governor 
Randall Kroszner notes that “only six percent of all the 
higher-priced loans were extended by CRA-covered 
lenders to lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods 
in their CRA assessment areas.”  Federal Reserve re-
searchers also report that subprime mortgages made in 
CRA-eligible neighborhoods perform at least as well as 
those made in similar non-CRA-eligible neighborhoods, 
that a large national affordable mortgage program has 
substantially lower defaults than the subprime segment, 
and that the majority of recent foreclosure filings have 
occurred in non-CRA eligible middle- and upper-income 
neighborhoods.19 
Beyond such aggregate findings, researchers have 
found it difficult to analyze CRA special programs at a 
more granular level. It is hard to identify such loans in 
broad datasets in the manner that, for example, sub-
prime or FHA loans can be identified. However, we at 
the UNC Center for Community Capital have access to 
a unique proxy involving more than 45,000 mortgages 
made to LMI borrowers: The Community Advantage 
Program (CAP).
Using CAP to Identify Significant Behaviors  
in CRA-Regulated Lending
In 1998, Self-Help Ventures Fund, in partnership with 
the Ford Foundation and Fannie Mae, introduced the 
Community Advantage Program (CAP). By establishing a 
new secondary market outlet for affordable and CRA-
type loans, the program sought to help thousands of 
low-income households build wealth through homeown-
ership and to show that lending to low-income home-
owners presents an acceptable level of risk. Participating 
lenders could develop their own customized programs, 
and then sell the loans to Self-Help.20 A landmark $50 
million grant from the Ford Foundation provided the 
capital support to enable Self-Help to guarantee the 
loans and sell them to Fannie Mae “with recourse.” In 
this way, Fannie Mae could fund loans that otherwise did 
not meet their underwriting requirements. 
Working secondary markets are vital to sustaining any 
mortgage activity, but capital markets are often poorly 
aligned with CRA lending. By providing liquidity for 
loans originated primarily under programs that made 
them ineligible for direct sale to Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac, CAP expanded the capacity of participating lenders 
to make loans under such programs.
As of the end of 2007, thirty-six lenders had partici-
pated in CAP, ranging from small, local institutions to 
national banks. The program had funded 49,800 home 
loans totaling $4.5 billion. All but two of the participat-
ing lenders were CRA-covered depository institutions.21 
Because CAP provides a unique opportunity to 
evaluate the benefits and costs of affordable mortgage 
lending, the Ford Foundation commissioned the UNC 
Center for Community Capital to perform a multi-year 
study of the program’s outcomes and impacts. In the 
following paragraphs, we present several findings from 
17	 	Federal	Financial	Institutions	Examination	Council	(FFIEC),	“A	Guide	to	CRA	Data	Collection	and	Reporting,”	(January	2001),	available	at	
http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/guide.htm.
18   Avery, Bostic and Canner, “CRA Special Lending Programs.”
19   Glenn Canner and Neil Bhutta, Memo to Sandra Braunstein “Staff Analysis of the Relationship between the CRA and the Subprime Crisis” 
(November	21,	2008),	available	at	http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/20081203_analysis.pdf.
20	 	Fannie	Mae	added	a	standardized	Self-Help	product	to	its	My	Community	Mortgage	product	suite	that	could	be	underwritten	via	Desktop	
Underwriter that came more broadly into use by the end of 2004. 
21	 	One	was	a	credit	union,	the	other	a	mortgage	banking	subsidiary	of	a	non-CRA	covered	financial	services	company.	These	contributed	only	a	
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our CAP research that shed light on how the market has 
responded to the CRA.
As mentioned above, under CAP, lenders developed 
their own guidelines and, consistent with the profile of 
CRA Special Lending Programs, all included at least one 
of the typical exceptions to standard underwriting rules: 
reduced cash to close, credit flexibility, and flexibility 
assessing ability to pay.22 Nearly 90 percent of the pro-
grams featured exceptions in at least two of these areas, 
and more than half featured exceptions in all three. Like 
other CRA Special Lending Programs, CAP uses a com-
bination of community and borrower targeting, and al-
though the requirements differ slightly from the CRA’s,23 
94 percent of CAP loans are CRA-eligible.24
As such, CAP loans may be taken to reflect the broad-
er field of “special CRA programs,” defined as “programs 
that banking institutions have established specifically to 
enhance their CRA performance.”25 CAP loans also re-
flect a direct response to the CRA by participating institu-
tions. CAP experiences thus provide unique insight into 
both the reach and performance of special CRA lending 
programs and the behavior of participating institutions in 
response to the act.
How CAP Loans Serve the Market 
How do these loan programs fit within the broader 
mortgage market context? Consistent with the general 
experience of CRA Special Lending Programs, they make 
up a very small share of CRA-related lending.26 Still, they 
provide financing to an underserved market segment. 
Over the period from inception to 2004, the average loan 
amount of $88,290 went to a home buyer with an aver-
age income of $33,924; the average CAP borrower had 
an income of 62 percent of the area’s median income 
(AMI). Forty percent of the borrowers were minorities. 
More than a third of the borrowers had origination credit 
scores below 660, and more than half of the loans had an 
original loan to value ratio of 97 percent or higher. 
Compared to other product lines—conventional 
prime, high-cost subprime, and FHA—CAP is more 
focused on LMI borrowers, and also on borrowers living 
in LMI areas, minority borrowers, and borrowers living 
in high-minority areas. Subprime lending lines up most 
closely with CAP, except that it is notably less directed at 
LMI borrowers (42 percent of subprime loans versus 90 
percent of CAP), due in part to the fact that there is no 
income limit on subprime lending (See Chart 1).27
Taking various features of each borrower and loan 
into consideration, we estimate that 88 percent of CAP 
loans have at least one major feature that would have 
made them otherwise ineligible for prime, conventional 
funding. Through CAP however, borrowers were still able 
to finance homeownership with prime loan features:  
22   Typical examples of each of these guidelines taken from a number of different programs: Borrower contribution of the lesser of $500 or one 
percent	of	purchase	price	with	no	reserves	required;	LTVs	up	to	103	percent;	FICO	floor	of	580;	if	no	score,	use	alternatives	ways	to	document	
12 month history of making payments; allowable debt to income ratios of 43 percent, or up to 45 percent with less than 25 percent payment 




25   Avery, Bostic and Canner, “CRA Special Lending Programs,” 713.
26	 	In	“CRA	Special	Lending	Programs,”	Avery,	Bostic	and	Canner	surveyed	the	500	largest	financial	institutions	in	1999.	Of	the	143	respondents,	
73 percent had at least one special CRA program, and 89 percent of the volume of loans originated through special programs was originated 
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30-year, fixed-rate loans with an average interest rate of 
7.3 percent; prohibited prepayment penalties; and, for 
the vast majority, retail-originated loans. The relatively 
low credit scores and high loan-to-value and debt-to-
income ratios common among CAP loans suggest that, 
in the absence of a program like CAP, these borrowers 
would not have qualified for a mortgage or would have 
been constrained to the high-cost subprime market.28
CAP’s Shifting Role: Creating Access and  
Subprime Alternative
A recent CAP analysis29 provides empirical evidence 
about the changing role of this community reinvestment 
lending over the past decade. We compared HMDA and 
CAP data at the census tract level for years when CAP 
loans were originated to years when no CAP loans were 
made. We found that in the early years of the program 
most CAP loans (75 percent) reflected new financing 
made available under prime terms and conditions. The 
remainder acted as a direct substitute for FHA loans 
within the same tract. 
This image of community reinvestment lending re-
verses with the dramatic growth of the subprime market 
from 2003 to 2006.  Analysis with respect to this later 
period suggests that, increasingly, community reinvest-
ment lending supplanted high-cost originations.  In fact, 
by 2004-2006, nearly two out of every three CAP loans 
substituted for a high-cost origination, while one-third 
appears to have created access to new credit. This shift 
mirrors the changes in policy discussions during this 
period as concerns shifted from fair access to credit 
towards access to fair credit. If the CRA was originally 
conceived to bring credit where there was none, it may 
have also functioned to keep some borrowers out of the 
subprime market in the later period. 
Though CAP and subprime lending may serve similar 
borrowers, the next issues under consideration must be 
whether there are substantive differences between CAP 
and subprime and what these differences might mean 
for the financial health of borrowers and lenders. Some 
heralded the subprime surge into minority and LMI mar-
kets as a democratization of credit, while others saw it 
as a separate and unequal form of credit that threatened 
household and community financial security. Today, we 
know that high risk, non-prime mortgages bode ill not 
only for borrowers and their neighborhoods but also for 
the safety and soundness of institutions. 
Risky Borrowers or Risky Products?: Borrower and 
Institutional Health
At the second quarter of 2008, 30 percent of sub-
prime loans were past due. The subprime serious 
delinquency rate (90 or more days delinquent or in 
foreclosure) was over five times that for CAP.30 But these 
overly generalized comparisons do not take into account 
differing borrower profiles. Here again, the CAP dataset 
allows for a risk-adjusted performance analysis to pro-
vide insight into whether the higher default experience 
associated with subprime loans is an inevitable result of 
lending to more underserved borrower types, or whether 
an effect is created by the mode of lending.
Ding, Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe31 empirically exam-
ine the relative risk of subprime mortgages and loans in 
the CAP program, using propensity score matching to 
construct a sample of comparable borrowers with similar 
characteristics but different loan products. They find con-
sistent evidence that, for borrowers with similar character-
istics, the estimated default risk is much lower with a CAP 
(prime-term) loan than with a subprime mortgage. The 
estimated cumulative default rate for a 2004 subprime 
loan is about four times that of a CAP loan, controlling for 
risk characteristics; for a 2006 subprime loan, the cumula-
tive default rate is about three-and-a-half times that of a 







Subprime Originations,” Working Paper (Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Center for Community Capital, Forthcoming), available at www.ccc.unc.edu.
30	 	Subprime	delinquency	figures	from	the	Mortgage	Bankers	Association	of	America	national	delinquency	survey	for	second	quarter	2008.
31   Lei Ding, Roberto Quercia, Wei Li, and Janneke Ratcliffe, “Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages: Disaggregating Effects Using Propensity 
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The results suggest that the higher default risk of 
subprime loans is significantly associated with the 
characteristics of the loan product and the origination 
channel (see Table 1). In particular, the broker channel, 
adjustable rate features, and prepayment penalties com-
mon with subprime loans contribute substantially to the 
elevated default risk. CAP loans contain none of these 
features. As Table 1 shows, the default rate for a 2004 
subprime loan with an adjustable rate, retail originated 
and without prepayment penalty is 1.6 times that for a 
CAP loan made that same year to a similar borrower. 
Adding broker origination and a prepayment penalty, 
however, increases the default risk of the subprime loan 
to 5.3 times that for the CAP loan. 
Table 1: Estimated Relative Default Rate32  
(Subprime Loans Compared to CAP Loans)
  Default Rate of
  Subprime Loans vs CAP
 Suprime Loan Feature  2004  2006
ARM  Prepay Penalty  Broker  Origination  Origination
        1.6 times   1.26 times
        3.3 times  3.3 times
        5.9 times  3.04 times
        5.7 times  3.6 times
        4.2 times  3.8 times
        5.3 times  4.0 times
The CAP experience thus adds to the body of empiri-
cal evidence that CRA-motivated lenders, like those 
involved in CAP, offer loan programs to underserved 
(low-income and minority) markets in direct response 
to the CRA, in a manner consistent with the safety and 
soundness principles embedded in the act. The CAP 
experience also highlights the contrast between CRA 
mortgages and much of the lending to a similar market 
by the unregulated, subprime sector. Similar findings 
were obtained by a recent Federal Reserve working 
paper: California loans originated by CRA-regulated 
institutions were significantly less likely to default than 
those originated by non-CRA-regulated institutions, even 
after controlling for borrower and loan characteristics.33 
Although CRA loans may have acted as a substitute for 
subprime loans on the front-end, they have performed 
starkly better in terms of safety and soundness for bor-
rowers and lenders alike. 
Not Enough CRA? 
In 2005, 49 percent (about one-half) of black borrow-
ers and 41 percent of Hispanic borrowers obtained high-
cost subprime loans, compared to just 21 percent (about 
one-fifth) of white borrowers. In communities where 
more than half the population was minority, 40 percent 
of all mortgages made in 2005 were high-cost subprime 
loans, compared to 23 percent of those made elsewhere. 
The discrepancy is nearly the same for those areas where 
median income was 80 percent or less of AMI compared 
to those with higher incomes (39 percent versus 24 per-
cent). Study after study finds high-cost and/or subprime 
lending to be more prevalent in the very areas targeted 
by the CRA.34 This begs the question: if the CRA is so 
successful, why did high-cost subprime lending concen-
trate in the very markets that the act seeks to serve?
In one of many indications that CRA-regulated lend-
ers have not adequately met “the credit needs of the 
local communities,” the Joint Center for Housing Studies 
provides examples of how CRA-regulated lenders held 
disproportionately lower market share in the low-income 
and/or high-minority portions of their assessment areas.35 
Mian and Sufi document how areas of “high latent de-
mand” in 1996 (those with the highest mortgage denial 
32	 	The	predicted	cumulative	default	rate	is	defined	as	90-day	delinquency	as	of	24	months	after	origination	for	a	borrower	with	a	FICO	score	
between	580-620	and	holding	a	mortgage	originated	in	2004	or	2006,	with	the	mean	value	of	other	regressors.	The	estimation	is	based	on	
regression results to be found in the forthcoming working paper. The subprime default is compared to the level of default for CAP loans, which 
are	retail	originated,	fixed-rate	loans	without	prepayment	penalty.
33	 	Elizabeth	Laderman	and	Carolina	Reid.	“Lending	in	Low-	and	Moderate-Income	Neighborhoods	in	California:	The	Performance	of	CRA	
Lending During the Subprime Meltdown,” Working Paper (San Francisco, CA: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, November 2008), 
available	at	http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/wpapers/2008/wp08-05.pdf.
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rates) subsequently experienced sharply higher growth 
in mortgage originations and later in defaults related to 
mortgages originated for sale to third parties other than 
the mortgage GSEs. It is not surprising that the likeli-
hood that any area is identified as having “high latent 
demand” is strongly correlated to lower socioeconomic 
conditions and higher minority populations.36 These ex-
amples indicate a persistent inadequacy in the supply of 
productive and sustainable capital to lower-income and 
minority markets; and suggest that the surge in subprime 
lending was, in large part, a response to this gap. 
Taken together, the evidence leads us to conclude that 
the CRA Lending Test does motivate more prime-term 
lending in target communities, but often only incremen-
tally more, and that the original conditions that motivated 
the act endure. As former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan recently declared, the subprime market “is 
now over,”37 but the market failure that it exposed is not, 
and is likely to be exacerbated by the erosion of property 
values, home equity, and credit histories in those markets 
where subprime lending was most prevalent. To whatever 
extent this market failure allowed the subprime boom 
to take root, the importance of working to correct such 
disparities now seems even more clear.
The CRA Service Test:  
The Answer Is Better CRA
We now turn to the provision of retail services, which 
falls under the purview of the Service Test. This test eval-
uates the “availability and effectiveness of a bank’s sys-
tem for delivering retail banking services.”38 It considers 
the distribution of branches and their openings and clos-
ings, non-branch systems for delivering banking services 
(such as ATMs and bank-at-work programs), the types of 
services offered, and the degree to which services are 
designed to meet customer needs, all with respect to the 
income level of the areas served. It favors innovations in 
activities such as low-cost accounts, credit counseling, 
savings initiatives, etc.39 A recent example of the poten-
tial of the CRA to stimulate retail financial services that 
really “meet the credit needs” of the community comes 
from the FDIC: participants in a pilot program for an 
affordable alternative to payday loans receive favorable 
CRA consideration.
However, there is ample evidence that in many com-
munities, the need for basic financial services is poorly 
served by mainstream banks, even as fees for checking 
and savings accounts increase.40 The decline and relative 
under-representation of bank branches in low-income 
and minority neighborhoods is well documented.41 On 
a visit to a predominantly African American community 
in Atlanta, a Federal Reserve Governor noted that “not a 
single financial institution was within view,” a situation 
that “occurs far too frequently in predominantly minor-
ity communities.”42 In 1999, when Savings for the Poor: 
the Hidden Benefits of Electronic Banking was written, it 
seemed that developing technologies held the promise to 
increase access to banking services for the poor. For ex-
ample, ATMs could cut the cost of bank transactions by 
36	 	Atif	R.	Mian	and	Amir	Sufi,	“The	Consequences	of	Mortgage	Credit	Expansion:	Evidence	from	the	2007	Mortgage	Default	Crisis,”	Working	
Paper	(Social	Science	Research	Network,	October	30,	2008),	available	at	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1072304.
37   Steve Bills, “Greenspan Comments on Crunch,” American Banker 172:222 (November 16, 2007):17.
38	 	FFIEC,	“A	Guide	to	CRA	Data	Collection	and	Reporting.”
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75 percent. But an analysis of ATM locations found that, 
particularly in cities’ “inner rings,” high-minority tracts 
and lower-income tracts had fewer ATMs per capita, and 
were more likely than their low-minority or high-income 
counterparts to have no ATMs.43 
Meanwhile, much as the subprime mortgage boom 
flourished in underserved markets, a parallel, high-
cost market has emerged in retail financial services as 
well. The last several years have witnessed an explo-
sive growth in the nonbank or fringe financial services 
industry: payday lenders, check cashers, rent-to-own 
furniture stores, etc. There are now more check cashers 
and payday lending outlets than there are McDonald’s 
restaurants, Burger Kings, Target stores, JC Penney’s loca-
tions, Sears, and Walmarts combined.44 
An estimated 49 percent of the population is clas-
sified as un- or underbanked. These individuals are 
disproportionately minority, lower income, and rent-
ing.45 Neighborhood characteristics also play a role, with 
researchers finding that areas with a greater minority 
share of population and/or lower income are relatively 
underserved by bank branches and overserved by check 
cashers and/or payday lenders.46 In this alternative 
market, the costs to consumers are high. A Brookings 
Institution study calculates that lower-income families 
may spend up to several thousand extra dollars annually 
for basic financial services.47
There is wide agreement that the CRA Service Test 
offers only weak incentive to reverse this trend, even 
though it is arguably the aspect best-aligned with the 
original spatial premise of the CRA.48 For one thing, the 
Service Test is open to a high degree of subjectivity and 
interpretation, making it relatively easy to earn a passing 
grade. An analysis of almost 2,000 CRA examinations 
conducted between 1996 and 2002 revealed that only 
11 out of 1,500 banks reviewed received a Needs to 
Improve and none earned a Substantial Noncompliance 
rating. The study also found inconsistencies across regu-
latory agencies. It concluded that the Service Test was 
often used as a ‘grade inflator’ to boost an institution’s 
overall CRA rating: “…under-performing banks—those 
on the border between a Needs to Improve and a Satis-
factory rating overall—are more likely to receive higher 
Service Test scores than other institutions…. The higher 
than expected Service Test scores often gave banks just 
enough cumulative points (11) to eke out a Satisfactory 
rating overall.”49 Furthermore, subsequent increases in 
the asset threshold of exempt institutions in 2005 means 
that 88 percent of all OTS-regulated institutions and 
96 percent of all FDIC-regulated institutions are now 
exempt from the Service Test.50 
Updating the CRA
With respect to both mortgage lending and retail 
financial services, it appears that dual-market problems 
persist, despite the existence of the CRA. Reverse redlin-
ing exists in part because redlining still exists. Of course, 
the CRA by itself could not have prevented the subprime 
crisis and cannot single-handedly address discrimination 
in the provision of capital. Thus, it works in conjunction 
with many other laws (such as the Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act). 
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But our evidence reveals that the CRA is an outstand-
ing (if imperfect) tool. Certainly, the act was not a cause 
of the current crisis; in fact, it may have mitigated it by 
keeping many households and banking institutions out of 
trouble. Further, with adjustments, the CRA can be a key 
part of the remedy for what is certain to be an upcoming, 
long-term withdrawal of credit from the hardest hit mar-
kets. To summarize some of the things that work well:
•  The act’s fundamental emphasis on maintaining 
“safety and soundness.”
•  The built-in adaptability of the act.
•  The incorporation of private participants in defining 
community needs, regulating “from below,” and 
keeping the regulators accountable.
•  Making activity data available in the public 
domain. This public good not only informs 
advocacy, it also enables research and continued 
assessment and refinement of the act.
•  The application of tangible goals coupled with effec-
tive reporting tools (i.e., HMDA) has had an impor-
tant hand in improving the provision of sustainable 
and affordable mortgage financing in particular.
The CRA’s Challenges
We now look at specific challenges for the CRA, 
largely due to the act’s failure to keep up with develop-
ments in the financial services marketplace. Sanctions 
are limited and parts of the incentive mechanism, in 
particular the Service Test, are weak; it overlooks harm-
ful practices; and it does not apply to a great number 
of financial service activities. In the following para-
graphs, we illustrate several of these points and end 
with a discussion of ways in which the CRA could be 
strengthened. 
Weakening enforcement, limited sanctions—Despite 
the ongoing need and some promising successes, there 
are indications that the CRA’s influence is declining. In 
2008 testimony to the House Financial Service Commit-
tee, Ron Homer of Access Capital Strategies lamented, 
“over the last five years I have noticed a waning of 
interest on the part of banks in seeking CRA lending and 
investment opportunities.”51 
The number of exams has fallen dramatically while 
the share of favorable grades has risen.52 Furthermore, 
except for public relations, it is hard to gauge the mar-
ginal value of obtaining an Outstanding grade rather 
than a Satisfactory. As the financial services industry 
becomes more and more consolidated, opportunities for 
its biggest negative reinforcement tool—challenges to 
mergers—are dwindling. In fact, in the current, crisis-
driven flurry of consolidation, it appears that the CRA 
will play virtually no role, and there is a question of how 
the surviving institutions will be held to its standards. 
We noted that the Service Test is fairly ineffectual, 
highly subjective, and applies only to the largest institu-
tions. It does not account for the many financial services 
that could potentially serve the “needs of the communi-
ty,” including, for example, small dollar credit and edu-
cation lending and the expanded services that banks can 
now offer under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).
Harmful practices—The CRA does not discourage 
counter-productive behaviors by covered institutions 
though CRA-covered institutions play a role in creating 
the dual market and have sometimes benefited from it. 
“Free checking” accounts, which can receive favorable 
CRA consideration, frequently feature extremely costly 
courtesy overdraft “protection.” In fact, depository insti-
tutions charged consumers $36 billion in fees for savings 
and checking accounts in 2006 and government investi-
gation documented difficulties obtaining fee disclosures 
at many banks’ branches and internet sites.53 High bank 
charges are also the primary justification used by the 
payday lending industry to charge APRs of nearly 400 
percent on short-term loans. Furthermore, many banks 
provide capital to support these high-cost services, act-
ing as wholesale providers of funding, money manage-
ment services, etc. As Howard Karger attests, “Today’s 
fringe economy is heavily dependent on mainstream 
financial institutions.”54
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What’s not covered—In 1977, CRA-covered institu-
tions made most of the mortgages and held most of 
the household savings in the United States. Over time, 
independent mortgage companies made an increasing 
share of mortgages, the share of Americans’ long-term 
savings held by CRA-covered institutions declined sub-
stantially, and money store businesses came to constitute 
a large market for basic financial services catering to 
less affluent households. It is outside the scope of this 
paper to explore the issue of extending CRA-type rules to 
other institutions, but we point out that rationalizing the 
regulatory environment could greatly advance the act’s 
mission. Moreover, regulators have the opportunity to 
consider such a change as new types of institutions seek 
federal financial support. 
In any case, the lack of regulatory consistency is not 
just a problem among different types of institutions, but 
across units of a single institution. Affiliate activity is only 
included in the CRA exam at the regulated institution’s 
option, creating a loophole that Dan Immergluck illus-
trates: “If an affiliate redlined lower-income communities, 
a bank would certainly choose not to have its activities in-
cluded in its exam.  If it happened to be an active lender 
in lower-income communities, the bank could, after 
the fact, earn a sort of  ‘extra credit’ by simply opting to 
include the affiliate's activities….They could funnel their 
mortgages to upper-income neighborhoods through their 
mortgage companies and leave the programs geared to 
low- and moderate-income borrowers in the bank itself.”55 
Moreover, to the extent that banks ration prime credit 
to certain markets, they create profit opportunities for 
subsidiaries to market high-cost alternatives. In fact, 
affiliates of CRA-regulated institutions accounted for 12 
to 13 percent of high-cost mortgages.56 Another loop-
hole concerns certain illegal practices on the part of a 
bank’s affiliate: these will count against the institution 
only if the bank elects to have its affiliate’s lending ac-
tivity included in the exam, and then only if the illegal 
activity occurs within the regulated institution’s CRA 
assessment area.57
Vertical disintegration in the mortgage market further 
contributes to misaligned incentives, but we should 
recognize that many of the various functions required to 
create, fund and service mortgages are performed some-
where in the span of CRA-covered institutions. For exam-
ple, there is no scrutiny of how the mortgage servicing 
function is helping to meet the credit needs of the target 
communities. In a similar vein, as the GLBA removed 
walls between financial service providers, more CRA-
relevant activities could be evaluated. And, if insurance 
companies acquire thrifts to access federal assistance,58 
what are the implications for the insurance activities of 
those institutions? 
Then there is the matter of assessment areas. Consoli-
dation, regulatory change, expansion and technology 
have loosened the geographic constraints once faced by 
traditional branch banking. As Federal Reserve Board 
Chairman Bernanke points out, “for some institutions, 
the concept of ‘community’ is no longer as clear as it 
was when the CRA was enacted.”59 It is telling that loans 
extended by depositories outside their assessment areas 
were more likely to be higher priced than loans origi-
nated within their CRA assessment areas.60
We are certainly not breaking new ground to suggest 
that, despite its built-in flexibility, the CRA has not fully 
kept up with changes in the industry. Recognizing both the 
successes of the CRA and its shortcomings in light of these 
changes is the key to successfully modernizing the act.
55	 	Dan	Immergluck,	Credit	to	the	Community;	Community	Reinvestment	and	Fair	Lending	Policy	in	the	United	States	(Armonk,	New	York:	M.E.	
Sharpe, 2004), 155.
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Recommendations
In keeping with the spirit of the CRA, our recom-
mendations are provided as broad principles, rather than 
prescriptive and detailed rules, most of which can be 
taken up at the regulator level.
•  Keep the act fundamentally intact, and seek to 
build on its strengths.
•  Level the regulatory playing field by expanding the 
scope of activities considered to include affiliates 
and certain activities outside of the assessment area 
construct.
•  Fine tune the measurements to remain in step with 
shifting markets. Extending credit that undermines 
financial security should receive negative (and 
certainly not positive) consideration. Enhancing the 
range of possible sanctions to include both positive 
and punitive consequences will give regulators 
greater flexibility to implement the act. For example, 
regulators can vary terms and conditions for bank 
borrowing, and offer benefits that can partially offset 
perceived and real costs of expanding services.
•  Strengthen the Service Test by evaluating delivery 
channels based on measures of effectiveness; 
assessing the quality of outreach and disclosure; 
incorporating more quantitative measures and 
benchmarks; and restoring coverage of the Service 
Test to more institutions. 
•  Revitalize the public’s role. Particularly in light of 
the current priorities of regulatory agencies, the 
public can play an important and cost-effective 
part in advancing the act. This will require that 
institutions and regulators provide deeper data on a 
broader set of activities. 
In closing, we return to our example of the Com-
munity Advantage Program as evidence that, in the 
long view, meeting the banking and credit needs of 
the community reinforces and is consistent with safety 
and soundness. The current mortgage crisis offers some 
evidence that failure to serve communities’ needs can 
be extremely costly. As Thomas Friedman points out: 
“We got away from the basics—where the lender and 
borrower maintain some kind of personal responsibility 
for, and personal interest in, whether the person receiv-
ing the money can actually pay it back…. We need to 
get back to collaborating the old-fashioned way. That is, 
people making decisions based on business judgment, 
experience, prudence, clarity of communications and 
thinking about how—not just how much.”61
In the face of financial crisis, Robert Shiller urges 
strengthening of the social contract.62 The CRA should 
be seen as a way to encourage the pursuit of long-term, 
broad-based strategies for successful and profitable com-
munity investment, versus short-term profits that may 
come at the expense of the broader community. If the 
CRA can be refined and adapted to the current market 
context in order to emphasize the former and discour-
age the latter, it can better fulfill its potential for positive 
impacts on both communities and institutions. 
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